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ralHistories represent the recollections
and opinions of the person interviewed,
and not the official position of MORS.
Omissions and errors in fact are corrected when
possible, but every effort is made to present the
interviewee’s own words.
Mr. Andrew W. ‘‘Andy’’ Marshall re-
ceived the Vance R. Wanner Memorial
Award in 2010. Mr. Marshall is the Director
of Net Assessment in the Office of the Sec-
retary of Defense, which he founded in
1973. (Editor’s note: Mr. Marshall retired
in January 2015 after serving over 40 years
as the Director.) The interview was con-
ducted on August 1, 2014 with Mr. Marshall
and Mr. Jim Bexfield, FS, Commander Phil
Pournelle, and Dr. Bob Sheldon, FS in the
Office of Net Assessment in the Pentagon.
MORS ORAL HISTORY
Interview with Mr. Andrew W. Marshall
Mr. JamesBexfield, FS,CommanderPhil Pour-
nelle, and Dr. Bob Sheldon, FS, Interviewers
Bob Sheldon: This is Friday, the first of
August, and we’re here at Andy Marshall’s
office in the Pentagon. Mr. Marshall, could
you first of all tell us your parents’ names
and where you were born?
Andy Marshall: My father’s name is
John Pollack Mitchell Marshall. And my
mother was Katherine Last Marshall. I was
born in Detroit, Michigan.
Bob Sheldon: Tell us a little bit about how
your parents influenced you.
Andy Marshall: My father was a reader,
so we had a lot of books in the house. Other
than that, they simply encouraged us, my
brother and me, to do well at school and
things of that sort.
Bob Sheldon: What did your dad do for
a living?
Andy Marshall:He was a stonemason. He
immigrated to this country in about 1910, and
my mother emigrated from England in 1915.
Bob Sheldon: A stonemason? Did your
father do any structures around here?




Andy Marshall: Yes, he was a lowland
Scot. He was born in Liverpool. His father,
who Iwasnamed after,was the chief engineer
on a ship that went from Liverpool to Bue-
nos Aires and back. He was killed at sea in
an accident. Even though my father was
born in Liverpool, at a quite young age,
probably when he was two or three, along
with his mother and some of the other chil-
dren, they went back to Scotland to a town
south of Glasgow named Carluke, which
I’ve never visited.
Bob Sheldon: You mentioned your par-
ents liked to read books.What kind of books
did they read?
Andy Marshall: One of the things my fa-
ther bought was a big multivolume collec-
tion of books on literature, and he had
a lot of technical books connected with ma-
sonry and architecture and things of that
sort.
Bob Sheldon: Tell us where you went to
grade school, middle school, and high
school.
AndyMarshall: I went to theMarxhausen
Elementary School that was about four or
five blocks from us. Then the intermediate
school was the Barbour Middle School
which also was five or six blocks from
where I lived. And then I went to Cass Tech-
nical High School, which was in center of
the town.
Bob Sheldon: These were all in Detroit?
Andy Marshall: Yes.
Bob Sheldon: What were your favorite
subjects in school?
Andy Marshall: Mathematics, geometry,
and this and that. Then in high school, alge-
bra and trigonometry and the beginnings of
calculus.
Bob Sheldon:Didyouhave a lot of college-
level courses?
Andy Marshall: Yes, it was a science and
technical high school.
Bob Sheldon: Where did you go to col-
lege? How did you choose your college?
AndyMarshall: I graduated in an impor-
tant year in history. I graduated in June of
1939, and I had a scholarship to go to
a school in the Upper Peninsula of Michi-
gan, but I decided not to do that and towork
for a year and then go to school. Then a year
later, in the fall of 1940, I went to the Univer-
sity of Detroit with the intention of going
into engineering. I found the courses dis-
appointing. They weren’t very muchmore
than I had already had in high school;
it was a very good high school. Heck,
one of the oddities, Lindbergh’s mother
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and I remember him visiting the school at one
point.
So I dropped out of college, got a job, and
then came December the 7th. The job I had
was in the Murray Body Company, which no
longer exists. At that time in Detroit, in addition
to the main automobile manufacturers, there
were a bunch of other firms that were more spe-
cialized, and a number of themweremaking the
bodies for cars. It had converted to producing
parts of airplanes. I think initially it was the
wings of one of the early Douglas bomber air-
craft. In high school, I had followed a set of
courses that were aimed at ending up as an en-
gineer, but in the course of it I learned how to
operate a lathe, milling machines, and a variety
of things. In fact, my homeroom in the high
school was the foundry that was on the top
floor of the school. So these jobs I had were
all as a machinist.
I had a heart defect, which I still have. I’ve
lived a very long life, but I was rejected by the
military. So I spent the war in this company in
various aviation things, making tools and de-
vices that were used in the manufacturing pro-
cess. In the fall of 1943, I began going in the
evenings to Wayne University. It hadn’t become
Wayne State University yet. I took French clas-
ses, took some philosophy courses and some
mathematics courses. Then as it became clear
that the war was coming to an end, I applied
to the University of Chicago.
They sent a test that I got one of the profes-
sors at the school to administer. The result of it
was they put me directly into the graduate
school. So I’ve never had an undergraduate de-
gree. Also at that point I didn’t think that one
could make a living as a mathematician. I had
no image of what was possible in the world,
so I decided I would go into economics, as it
was the more mathematical of the social sci-
ences. I entered Chicago in September 1945
and started in economics. But in the course of
the economics I discovered there existed this
field of mathematical statistics. So while I com-
pleted a master’s degree there, largely in con-
nection with the Cowles Commission (Cowles
Commission for Research in Economics) which
was then still at Chicago, in econometrics. Larry
Klein, the economist, had developed this 12-
equation model for the economy, and used
it—the parameters were fitted on the data up
to the beginning of the war and at that point
in 1947–1948 there were a couple of postwar
years. So what I did was take the data and see
how good it was doing in predicting and fitting
things.
Bob Sheldon: Was that a regression model?
Andy Marshall: It was a multiple regression-
type model. Well, it’s really a set of simulta-
neous equations. So that was my master’s.
Jim Bexfield: Did you meet Clayton Thomas
(MORS Fellow and Chief Scientist of the Air
Force Studies and Analyses Agency) at Chi-
cago? He was there at roughly the same time.
Andy Marshall: No, I didn’t.
I began pursuing all of the courses in statis-
tics that were there, Jimmie Savage in particular,
but I also got to know Allen Wallis and took
a course with him. It was called readings or
something, but what it turned out to be was he
and I would meet and talk, and then he got
a lot of mail questions, so a part of this course
turned into preparing his answers to many of
the letters. He would give me a bunch of letters
to write the response to. At the time, Chicago
did not have a doctoral degree in mathematical
statistics, so I asked him, ‘‘Where might I get
a job for a couple of years until I decided where
I could go to pursue that.’’
He came upwith two possibilities. One was
some US governmental office in Chicago and
the other was the RAND Corporation. There
was a man at Chicago whowas going to RAND,
Herbert Goldhamer, and he had as part of his
agreement to go, there was a project he wanted
to do. He was basically a sociologist, but he
wanted someone to help himwith the statistical
analysis, so he interviewed me and I went to
RAND. So just by happenstance, it changed
the whole rest of my life.
Jim Bexfield: Did you move to RAND in
California?
Andy Marshall:No, he was in the social sci-
ences department which was mainly in Wash-
ington. I came initially to Washington. I joined
RAND on January 5, 1949.
Bob Sheldon: Was most of your statistical
training in Chicago on classical statistics or
Bayesian statistics?
Andy Marshall: Most of it was the more tra-
ditional statistics, but clearly Savage, who I got
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to know very well over the years, was already
moving down the line of Bayesian statistics.
Jim Bexfield: Did you have a favorite hobby
when you were growing up? Was there some-
thing you really liked to do?
Andy Marshall: Sports.
Jim Bexfield: What kind of sports?
Andy Marshall: Baseball, football.
Jim Bexfield: So you played those?
Andy Marshall: Yes.
Jim Bexfield: In high school?
Andy Marshall: No, the high school I went
to—well, they did have a baseball team but it
was not a big in sports. It was a little bit like
the University of Chicago [laughs] in that sense.
Jim Bexfield: Yes, they were not noted for
their athletics.
Andy Marshall: That’s right, yes.
Jim Bexfield: What position did you play in
baseball?
Andy Marshall: Catcher.
Jim Bexfield:And your brother; was he older
or younger?
Andy Marshall: A year and a half younger.
Jim Bexfield: And he went off to school in
a totally different direction than you did?
AndyMarshall:Yes.He alsowent toCassTech-
nicalHigh School, but hewent into the curriculum
that was connected with electronics, electrical
things of various sorts. When he initially left
school, he worked for a little bit in GE, and there
was an x-ray machine they were making at the
time. He served in the Air Force in World War II.
Bob Sheldon: Getting back to statistics, in
some parts of the statistics community, there’s
a feud between the Bayesian statisticians and
the classical statisticians. Did you encounter
that feud in Chicago?
Andy Marshall: It hadn’t really erupted.
Later, yes, because after I’d been at RAND for
a while I decided I would go back and finish
the work for a doctorate. But then again plans
don’t ever work out in some way. So when I de-
cided to do that, I went there in September 1953.
I had made that decision, but then Wallis asked
me to teach his courses. He had been selected by
the Ford Foundation to do a survey of universi-
ties and the teaching of the social sciences. He
was the head of that and he was going to spend
the year running this examination. So at the last
moment he asked me to teach his courses.
Jim Bexfield: What were the subjects?
Andy Marshall: It was beginning classical
statistics. He may have published it later, but
he had a set of course directions. So I ended
up the year doing that. I’d already gotten to
know Savage better because he came out to
RAND in the summers. I had already trans-
ferred within RAND in the beginning in the
summer of 1950, more or less moved to Califor-
nia and had also been recruited by Charlie Hitch
(who later was the Assistant Secretary of De-
fense from 1961–1965) to spend initially half
my time in the economics department and half
my time in social science. But then a year later,
the summer of 1951, I was spending all my time
in the economics department.
Jim Bexfield: At RAND?
Andy Marshall: At RAND, yes.
Jim Bexfield: And Charlie Hitch was in
charge of that department?
Andy Marshall: Yes.
Jim Bexfield: What was it like to work for
him?
Andy Marshall: He was terrific and very im-
portant in terms of where I’ve ended up.
Jim Bexfield: Hitch and McKean’s The Eco-
nomics of Defense in the Nuclear Age was written
roughly around that time.
Andy Marshall: It came out in 1960.
Jim Bexfield: That was one of the bibles, and
still is.
Andy Marshall: And that was in part a com-
pendium of the state of the art at RAND in the
late 1950s.
Jim Bexfield: Of the work that you were do-
ing and he was doing?
Andy Marshall: Yes, right.
Bob Sheldon: Can you talk about some of
your early projects at RAND?
Andy Marshall: The first one was the project
with Herbert Goldhamer. In World War II,
a much larger portion of the people coming up
in the draft was rejected for psychological rea-
sons as comparedwithWorldWar I. So this pro-
ject was an attempt to address the question of,
‘‘If we ever have to mobilize again, will the re-
jection rate be even higher or not?’’ So the pro-
ject involved digging back in the history of
treatment of mental disease in the United States.
I ended up initially spending a lot of time in the
Library of Congress because there had been
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early censuses that had included data on the
number of people in the population with serious
mental disease. Some of the standard ones in
Iowa, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and so on.
But then, someone discovered there was
a hospital outside Boston, McLean Psychiatric
Hospital. Therewas aman there, Edward Jarvis,
who turned out to be one of the early American
statisticians. In fact, this man was the President
of the American Statistical Society for 30 years.
In fact, the book that Goldhamer and I wrote
at the end of the study, called Psychosis and Civ-
ilization (it wasmainly Goldhamerwrote it; I did
all of the statistical things), is dedicated to this
man. Beginning about 1833, Massachusetts be-
came very concerned about the treatment of
mental disease so they began keeping data. This
man, when he was connected with McLean
Hospital, had done a kind of census and then
the reports of all of the particular insane asy-
lums, just a lot of digging back andwewere able
to reconstruct 100 years of pretty good data.
What it showed was there was no increase, at
least of the serious classical mental diseases.
That’s why Herb called the book Psychosis and
Civilization because there was a lot of belief that
civilized societies were more stressful and more
people were.
Not true. At least for the classical psychiat-
ric disorders. Also a lot of the increase in the
modern period was a changed practice in what
to do with senile people. In the old days, they
were kept at home and then they got unloaded
on various institutions.
Jim Bexfield:What was your next big project
at RAND?
Andy Marshall: I was invited by Hitch in the
summer of 1950 to come to RAND, and there
was a special study effort that summer at RAND
on the lessons from World War II, on the con-
duct of strategic bombing campaigns, from
more of the economics of the damage, how ef-
fective they were. Hitch was there; while he’d
been recruited much earlier, he was only able
to finally take his position there in the spring
of 1950. He, himself, had been involved in
a group that was evaluating the effectiveness
of the bombing in England, and he knew all
the other people that had been involved, people
like Carl Kaysen and Harold Barnett and Sydney
Alexander. These were all the economists
who’d been involved as the bombing survey
was being conducted, not just the afterwards
evaluation.
That led to, as I was doing things for the eco-
nomics department, it was a continuation of
that. I ended up spending a lot of time on the So-
viet economy, from the point of view of if you’re
trying to knock out its core industrial strengths,
what, in fact, were the targets, and looking at
a damage effects of nuclear weapons delivered
on them. In fact, a lot of the early RAND studies
were predicated on the notion that if a war starts
and the Soviets invade Europe, basically what’s
going to happen is that hopefully we hold on at
the Pyrenees or have some foothold, that we
have nuclear weapons and they don’t, or we
have a lot more or we have means of delivering
them. We carry out a strategic bombing cam-
paign and greatly reduce their economic capa-
bilities. We remobilize and eventually push
them back.
Bob Sheldon:Was this study being done dur-
ing the Korean War?
Andy Marshall: We had just started, yes.
Bob Sheldon: Did that influence your study?
Andy Marshall: No, it didn’t. It was solely
on, what if you learned we have to conduct
a strategic bombing campaign against the Soviet
Union, how would we do it? What have we
learned about what are the best targets?
Jim Bexfield: I assume you dealt some with
SAC, Strategic Air Command, because they
would probably be one of your customers?
AndyMarshall: I suppose so, but it wasmore
just collecting the knowledge and notions of
how you ought to really do this. There was
a lot of criticism about how the bombing cam-
paign had been conducted in World War II, that
they hadn’t gotten on to the right targets and
they had quarrels with the British. There was
a whole set of issues about it.
Jim Bexfield:Were these studies classified or
unclassified?
Andy Marshall: They were classified.
Bob Sheldon: So who were your customers
for the studies? Was there a particular agency
at the Pentagon?
Andy Marshall: To some extent the things
that I did were really inputs to other studies,
more or less at RAND. I didn’t have personally
much concern about who the ultimate customer
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was. I spent a lot of time talking to other people
in the government because they were working
on similar problems, particularly the Air Force
Intelligence people. So, I was more connected
with Washington than with SAC where these
were concerned.
Jim Bexfield: And you moved out to Califor-
nia at some point?
Andy Marshall: I had moved. I went there
and stayed there. I remember goingmore or less
the day after the Korean War began and I was
there the whole summer. I went back around
September just to pick upmy things and go back
again to California in October.
Jim Bexfield: So you stayed for quite a while
in California?
Andy Marshall: Yes.
Jim Bexfield: What year did you move back
to Washington, DC?
AndyMarshall: I didn’t think that I wasmov-
ing to [laughs] DC. I had a house in California in
Brentwood near Santa Monica until December
2006. I came back here, I thought temporarily,
to do some work for Henry Kissinger in the
White House in the fall of 1969.
Bob Sheldon: Let’s back up to you finishing
up at RAND and going to teach courses. What
year did you go back to teach courses forWallis?
Andy Marshall: September 1953 through
March/April 1954, and then I went back to
RAND. In the meantime, I had decided I didn’t
really need a doctorate.
Bob Sheldon: Did you see a lot of GI bill stu-
dents in Chicago?
Andy Marshall:When I first went there, yes,
but by the time I went back, no.
Jim Bexfield: You’ve now gone through all
that nuclear work at RAND, and then you tran-
sitioned into some new fields at that point?
Andy Marshall: What had happened was,
and this again happened because of this early
assignment by Hitch to work on this problem
of the appropriate targets in the Soviet Union,
that I got more andmore connected with people
in the intelligence world. Then in the summer of
1952, Hitchmade a trip to Europe to visit the Air
Force headquarters which was in Wiesbaden,
Germany.
The general who was in charge of intelli-
gence there asked Hitch for help on two or three
problems. When he came back to RAND, Hitch
asked me and Jim Digby, to go to Wiesbaden to
work on the strategic warning problem. There
was some resistance from the Air Force Intelli-
gence in Washington, so we had to write some
preliminary papers. I don’t knowwhat the issue
reallywas orwhether thismade any sense, what
kind of disagreement it was. But anyway, in Au-
gust of 1952, Digby and I went to Wiesbaden
and spent the next five months or so. In fact,
we came back finally in December just before
Christmas. I was working on how to improve
the strategic warning analysis.
Bob Sheldon: What kind of factors did you
look at for the strategic warning?Were they eco-
nomic factors or were they military mobiliza-
tion factors?
Andy Marshall: Mostly mobilization factors.
We tried to think of things that were last-minute
preparations that they would have to make; col-
lecting blood and other things. Then we tried to
work, provide some ideas on how to weigh out
the various things into some overall index. We
also were asked to look at, once we were there,
at the kind of emergency evacuations that would
be triggered by a real decision, and we made
some suggestions about how to improve that.
The plan basically was that all of the lawyers
and the other nonfighting parts of the headquar-
ters, the officers, would be organized and lead
the evacuation of the families by everybody driv-
ing in their cars from Wiesbaden to Bordeaux,
a pretty long distance.
Jim Bexfield: Are there other memories you
have during your early years at RAND that
you’d like to talk about?
Andy Marshall:Hitch was very interested in
the whole development of the Operations Re-
search Society of America (ORSA) and was an
early person involved in a variety of ways (he
was the eighth president of ORSA in 1959),
and he gave a number of talks. He would often
have me look at those and supply some ideas,
but it led to several of us going with Hitch to
what might have been the first of the meetings
of the International Federation of Operational
Research Societies (IFORS) in Aix-En-Provence,
France. The 1950s were a time of a fair amount
of flying back and forth to Europe to visit the
SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers
Europe) headquarters in France and to take
the results of studies.
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Jim Bexfield: Now, at that time did you have
a family?
Andy Marshall: I got married in 1953, just
before I went off to Chicago.
Jim Bexfield: And kids?
Andy Marshall: No, no children.
Jim Bexfield: And your wife, did she work
outside the home?
Andy Marshall: She had been a secretary at
RAND and for a while she worked there during
the summer. RAND had this practice during the
summer of inviting a lot of people who are usu-
ally on special studies of one sort or another. For
several summers after we were married she did
that, but then dropped that. She got involved in
some other activities.
Jim Bexfield: What are some of those other
activities?
Andy Marshall: One of the things she got in-
volved in, there was a group of women that ev-
ery two years ran a—it was called a thieves
market. They collected furniture and all kinds
of materials from everywhere, sitting in the
middle of Bel Air and Hollywood. One of the
stores, Robinson’s in Beverly Hills, would turn
over its parking garage for three days, and they
all collected the stuff and the money went to
support of the art students at UCLA. The State
of California built buildings and but they
wouldn’t buy any objects of art. I don’t know
whether you’ve been to UCLA, but there’s
a big area with all these modern sculptures.
There’s a little museum and they have paintings
and so on, also provided scholarships for stu-
dents to go abroad. And they made an amazing
amount of money for the time.
Bob Sheldon: Getting back to Hitch, Hitch
drew together a lot of the newly formed experts
in operations research and systems analysis and
all those papers. Did you get to meet a lot of
those early experts in systems analysis?
Andy Marshall: Yes.
Bob Sheldon:Can you name any in particular
that impressed you?
Andy Marshall: There were a lot of people.
One of the critical people was Albert Wohlstetter
in a way, not so much for the things that have
attracted more attention, but he changed the
whole approach to the process of doing studies.
In fact, one of the reasons the economists got so
involved in the whole systems analysis business
was that. originally the idea was, ‘‘Okay, we’re
in the strategic warfare business and you need
economists because of design of targets, evalua-
tion of effects. You also need them because you
want to look at the economics on our side, the
costs of things.’’ But, early on the economists no-
ticed that the larger RAND-wide studies that
were being undertaken were not being done
very well. The engineers who were principally
running them were making what essentially
were mistakes in what they maximized or min-
imized. Several of the early studies were, ‘‘What
should the next bomber look like? What design
should it be?’’
They had somany targets they thought they
had to destroy and the targets were going to be
defended. It was also from the beginning as-
sumed at RAND that you wanted these strikes
to be intercontinental. They were not based on
forward bases, even though SAC itself was at
the time planning to fight mainly from forward
bases. They would put together some criteria or
measure of goodness and then look at many,
many designs of airplanes and weed out certain
ones. Wohlstetter, when he was asked in the
early 1950s to look at the basing problem, took
a very different approach. In the first place, in
this case there already was an approach that
existed, so you wanted to come up with some-
thing that was better and did better against
a wide variety of counteractions an opponent
might take. So you didn’t pick just one criteria
at the beginning. You evolved a set of tests for
the systems and consistently looked at how
you could build something, put something to-
gether that was superior to what was already
being proposed as the direction to go. So as
you learned more about the problem, the tests
got better and more complicated.
Jim Bexfield: RAND at that time was a hub
for operations research, and you had Danzig
(linear programming), Bellman and Dryfus
(dynamic programming) and Dresher (game
theory).
Andy Marshall: Right, a lot of that.
Jim Bexfield:Did you work with any of those
people?
Andy Marshall: Oh, yes.
JimBexfield: I bet thatwasabsolutely fascinating.
Andy Marshall: Yes, well at the beginning,
the mathematics department was a really terrific
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place, and in the summer you had these really
good people came in addition.
Jim Bexfield: Is there one person in particular
that stands out as one of the people that came
for a summer activity?
Andy Marshall: That’s one of the reasons
I got to know Jimmie Savage so well. Some of
the other obviously very prestigious mathema-
ticians I didn’t have much connection with.
There were other good people like Ted Harris
(stochastic processes). A lot of the people were
connected with Princeton; we had Alex Mood
(statistician) and George Brown (who worked
as computer expert).
Bob Sheldon:Did you have to do a lot of your
own numerical calculations by hand for your
economics work?
Andy Marshall: At the time everyone had
your own desk computer, but there were people
around who you could give calculation prob-
lems to. For myself personally, thinking of that,
Herman Kahn was a very good friend of mine.
We were both about the same age; he was about
six months younger than me. There were long
periods when we would go out together every
night. We were both unmarried; we had this ex-
perience of going from graduate school to be-
ing very well paid at the time. [laughs] It was
through him I got interested in the details of
what was happening in the design of nuclear
weapons and the use of large computers. He
was one of the early big users of computers,
doing Monte Carlo calculations—some of it re-
lated to shielding problems, but others to bomb
design. He would disappear for weeks at a time
when some new computer came online and go
there and try to work on it. I spent some time
assisting him a couple of times using a new
UCLA computer.
Jim Bexfield:As I recall, hewas pretty contro-
versial with some of his views.
Andy Marshall: Well, later. He had several
careers in his life. When I met him initially in
the spring of 1951, he was in the physics depart-
ment connectedwith theseMonte Carlo calcula-
tions of a variety of things. In the middle 1950s,
he became interested in what the rest of RAND
was doing in these kind of systems. He heard
about some of it through me. And then there
was a course that Quade (an expert in systems
analysis) put together. I think the second time
it was given, Herman asked to give a lecture
and that led to his second career as a showman
critic and author of the Ten Common Pitfalls, and
various other lectures.
Then he thought that RAND ought to be do-
ing more on civil defense. So he then ran in the
later 1950s a study connected with civil defense
of what you could do. And then he went off to
Princeton, and wrote on thermonuclear war.
Then he came back briefly, but then left to form
the Hudson Institute.
Jim Bexfield:Did you deal with himwhen he
was at the Hudson Institute?
Andy Marshall: A little. He kept trying to re-
cruit me to go there. [Laughter] But I didn’t want
to go. We remained very good friends, but I
didn’t see as much of him. Then he became
a much more public figure.
Jim Bexfield: Let’s get into your transition
from RAND. When did you leave RAND to
come to DoD (Department of Defense)?
AndyMarshall: I went fromRAND in the fall
of 1969 to do two studies for Kissinger, whom I
had met once or twice. He called me up and
asked me to come see him when I was next in
Washington, and I did so in September of
1969. I was on my way to Europe, to France,
with my wife for about three weeks. So I went
to see him and he told me that Nixon and he
were very disappointed in the performance of
the Intelligence Community, and Nixon had felt
that when he’d previously been in the White
House as Vice President it had been better. For
Henry Kissinger—I don’t know what his com-
parison was. So he wanted me to come and do
two studies for him. One was to look at the
whole process by which intelligence came to
the White House, how it was decided, what to
send, et cetera, and what could be done to im-
prove it. The second was to pick a topic that I
would look at and provide an assessment of
how good it was as a product. And he said, ‘‘I
don’t want you to look at political intelligence;
I can judge that myself, I know that is not so
good.’’ So we talked a little while and decided
that I would look at the Soviet strategic missile
programs. So I came after I returned, about
Thanksgiving time I finally got there, and un-
dertook these studies.
Jim Bexfield: So you were in the government
at the time?
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Andy Marshall: No, I was at RAND.
Jim Bexfield: So, you were hired as a RAND
researcher to work in the White House to do
these studies?
Andy Marshall: Yes.
Jim Bexfield:Wow! How did Kissinger know
you?
Andy Marshall: I don’t know. I had met him
a couple of times. My guess is, and this is only
a guess, that he asked some people, very possi-
bly Fred Ikle´ (Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy from 1981–1988), ‘‘Who is it that knows
something about intelligence and would be
a person who could do this?’’ and Fred men-
tioned me. That’s my guess. Because by that
time I had been spending time on various in-
telligence problems, particularly up through
1963–1964 along with Joe Loftus, who came to
RAND in the spring/summer of 1954. He had
been in Air Force Intelligence. In fact, for a while
he had run the group within Air Force Intelli-
gence that focused on the Soviet nuclear pro-
grams. Anyway, because I had this earlier
connection with intelligence, we became very
good friends and we then undertook a variety
of studies and efforts to address the question,
‘‘How could you make better projections of So-
viet military forces?’’
Bob Sheldon: Did you do the study in Santa
Monica or here in DC?
Andy Marshall: I came to a little office in the
Old Executive Office Building. I completed
them, the second one on the missile programs,
in the middle of May of 1970. And then I
returned to RAND. But then Kissinger kept ask-
ing me to do things. In the summer of 1970 I
came back, he put together a panel of people
who he wanted some advice from. Then at
RAND for several months then in December of
1970, Nixon directed Kissinger and George
Shultz to do a study of the reorganization of
the Intelligence Community. While nominally
someone on Kissinger’s staff was his person,
in fact, even though I was still at RAND and I
became his—Jim Schlesinger was at OMB (Of-
fice of Management and Budget) and he was
in charge of the study under Shultz.
Bob Sheldon: That nuclear study you that you
did for Kissinger, did you give him any counter-
intuitive results or any results that were contrary
to the schoolhouse solutions at the time?
Andy Marshall: What it led to was another
task. I had suggested that one of the things that
might work would be to assign a topic to the in-
telligence people and give them a lot of direc-
tion, much more direction than usually takes
place, about what are the questions that you re-
ally have that you want answered and to look at
drafts, to monitor it, to try to make it an exem-
plar of the level of analysis you wanted. So
a topic was picked; it was the SS-9 (a Soviet in-
tercontinental ballistic missile). So they under-
took to do that, but then I was asked to play
this role of reviewing it as it came along and
reminding them that we wanted to know more
about this or that, so they finally produced this
thing. I don’t know that it was very effective
in the long run.
Bob Sheldon: Did you behave like a red team
looking at their stuff?
Andy Marshall: I don’t know whether
you’d call it a red team, it was more like a re-
search director.
Jim Bexfield: So you had a lot of influence
over how the effort took place?
Andy Marshall: Yes.
Jim Bexfield: So then Kissinger kept calling
you back and eventually you took a different
job?
Andy Marshall: What happened was that in
terms of this reorganization of the Intelligence
Community, there was an early report in March
1971 that laid out some alternatives and went to
Nixon. He picked one of the alternatives and
then through the summer and fall we were in-
volved in fleshing that out. And then final direc-
tives had to be prepared, and by that time
Schlesinger had left OMB, he’d gone to the
Atomic Energy Commission. So I ended up
writing the final directive that Nixon would sign
and some other memos. I think that Alexander
Haig and Wayne Smith, who was nominally
Kissinger’s person on the thing, brokered this
deal around and they inserted the creation on
the NSC (National Security Council) of a net as-
sessment group that was on the one hand to ini-
tiate at the national level a net assessment
process, but also this reorganization created an
NSC committee that Kissinger was to chair that
was to give direction to the Intelligence Com-
munity as to what the top-level organizations
wanted as products and also to provide reviews
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and evaluations of their performance. And then
they offered me this job. I had not supposed—
that was not part of my draft of the directive.
[Laughter]
I was very reluctant to do that. I was quite
happy at RAND, though not spending as much
time as I should’ve been. Also, I had taken over
from Schlesinger this newly created position at
RAND of the Director of Strategic Studies. I
was not spending enough time at it, andmywife
was not anxious to come to Washington, either.
Bob Sheldon: Who coined the term ‘‘net
assessment’’?
Andy Marshall: Well, the term itself was
coined in the aftermath of World War II. The
people who wrote about intelligence set various
levels of analysis and this would be the most
comprehensive. But there had been some use
of it. In fact, this group that I mentioned that’d
been formed by Kissinger in summer of 1970; I
was on it, Bill Kauffman, Wayne Smith, Charlie
Herzfeld, former director of DARPA (Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency), and also
Jim Schlesinger and Fred Hoffman. Herzfeld
suggested that we need a kind of broad net as-
sessment of where we stand with respect to
the Soviets. So Schlesinger and I began to write
a broad assessment, and then he got diverted
and I finished it. So that may have led Kissinger
or Haig to think that they wanted something
more like that.
Jim Bexfield: So you did take the job?
Andy Marshall: Yes, I did. But with the idea
that I was going to be there for a couple of years
and that was it.
Jim Bexfield: Was it a political position or
a regular civil service position?
AndyMarshall: It was a civil service position
but it was.
Jim Bexfield: PL-313 or something?
Andy Marshall: Something like that. I have
no idea. All I know is that when I ended up here
in DoD, I think Doc Cooke (Director of Admin-
istration and Management) was the one who
made me—I’m really a noncareer civil servant.
Whatever that category is [laughs].
Jim Bexfield: So you worked in the White
House for a couple years in that position?
Andy Marshall: Right.
Jim Bexfield: And it was mostly associated
with intelligence?
Andy Marshall: We had two tasks. One was
to start this net assessment effort and the other
was to play this role for Henry Kissinger—this
committee. It met only a couple of times. State
and Defense were the other big players, and I
think Treasury.
But the big problem may have been that
Melvin Laird (Secretary of Defense from 1969
to 1973) had been very interested in setting up
a net assessment effort in DoD, and he felt this
was another infringement of Kissinger on his
territory. There were considerable negotiations
back and forth as to how to set up this process.
The first study that had been assigned to De-
fense had just started when I moved here, there
was a deal betweenKissinger and Schlesinger to
move the whole office over here. Not just me.
Schlesinger had wanted to recruit me to come
as an individual and start an office here. Again,
my wife and I had thought we wanted to get
back to California, but this deal wasmade to just
ship the whole office over.
Jim Bexfield: Over to the Pentagon?
Andy Marshall: Yes.
Jim Bexfield: Schlesinger was the Secretary of
Defense at that time?
AndyMarshall:Yes. It happened inOctober/
November of 1973.
Jim Bexfield: So what was your first major
project that you did for him?
AndyMarshall:Hewas a very close friend of
mine, so we just sat down and decided the first
three assessments that we wanted to do were
a strategic nuclear balance, the balance on the
Central Front of NATO, and the maritime bal-
ance. And the fourth one that came along pretty
soon after that was the so-called investment bal-
ance which attempted to look at the portion of
the resources being put in both by ourselves
and the Soviet Union that were going into lon-
ger term investment.
Bob Sheldon: How did you approach those
studies? Did you gather together a team of guys
working on that with you or did you do it solo?
Andy Marshall: The first thing was we in-
creased the size of the office. When it had been
in the White House, it was myself, two people,
Robin Pirie (former Acting Secretary of the
Navy), and Chip Pickett, a naval officer and an
army officer, and two secretaries. Once coming
over here we added some additional positions.
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT . . . ANDREW W. MARSHALL
Military Operations Research, V20 N1 2015 Page 73
Jim Bexfield:How large was your staff in the
Pentagon? What’s the largest number you had
as part of Net Assessment?
Andy Marshall: The largest the office has
ever been is 17 people.
Jim Bexfield: So you kept it reasonably small.
Andy Marshall: Yes, smaller now. We’re
down to around 15 or 14.
Jim Bexfield: In those early years from 1973 to
about 2000, if you had to pick out one or two
seminal net assessments that you did that had
major impacts, what would they be?
Andy Marshall: For one thing it took a while
to produce high-quality assessments. One of the
first things you find is there are a lot of data
problems. Particularly, because we were look-
ing ahead 5 or 10 years. We wanted to look back
20 years or something like that to try to under-
stand longer-term trends and shifts that were
taking place. Thatwhole focus of the assessment
was really on, are things going in the right direc-
tion or in the wrong direction, and what are the
key competitions that are taking place. So it
wasn’t until the middle 1980s that I think we fi-
nally did a really high-quality assessment on the
Central Front and NATO. It was similar for the
strategic force as we did much better work on
the naval side early and theASW (anti-submarine
warfare).We did a useful study on command and
control in the late 1970s.
Bob Sheldon: Do you recall any specific deci-
sions that were impacted by those studies?
AndyMarshall: It’s hard to know for some of
them. Command and control led to issuing of
directives by Harold Brown. The first Secretary
who probably really profited was Brown (who
was Secretary of Defense from 1977 to 1981).
There was some use early of the investment bal-
ance, because it tended to show that the Soviets
were probably investing more than we were.
Jim Bexfield: Did you have many dealings
with people like Lt Gen Glenn Kent and the
Air Force analysts or Wilbur Payne and Walt
Hollis and some of the Army analysts or Bruce
Powers in the Navy?
AndyMarshall: In the Army it was Vandiver.
It was Schlesinger’s intent to encourage
each of the Services to set up a net assessment
office. Zumwalt (Elmo ‘‘Bud’’ Zumwalt, Jr.,
Chief of Naval Operations from 1970–1974)
did set up such an office.
Jim Bexfield:Wayne Hughes (who was in the
Office of CNO (OP-96) from 1973–1975) and
people like that?
AndyMarshall:Yes.WilliamManthorpe, for-
mer Director of the Navy’s Net Assessment, Of-
fice (OP-96N). There was an early head of it who
died young, suddenly. I forget his name now.
The Army did not, but appointed Vandiver as
the point of contact if you wanted things. And
we got a lot of work also from Army Intelli-
gence, particularly in trying to understand
how the Soviets measured things, their indices,
planning factors.
Jim Bexfield: John Battilega?
Andy Marshall: Battilega, and before him
there was another guy. But there was a lot of just
collecting of materials. The Air Force did not set
up a net assessment group. They did some par-
ticular studies for us when we asked. Jasper
Welch (Major General Welch was Assistant
Chief of Staff for Studies and Analysis from
1975–1979); those guys worked for him for
a while.
Bob Sheldon: Let me ask a Bayesian question.
There’s a philosophical concern amongst Bayesians
on how much do you weigh the historical knowl-
edge that you have, your prior, versus your
new data that you see today. In net assess-
ments, how do you view that balance between
the old, historical biases and the new informa-
tion you see?
Andy Marshall: I guess I personally put a lot
more weight on understanding of the past. I
think one of the most valuable things has been
this going back and looking at the ongoing
trends, the trends and the asymmetries between
ourselves and the other side. In the end, the
thing that struck me was just how totally differ-
ent the Soviet military forces were from ours. It
runs in a totally different way, operates with ad-
aptations required by problems they have with
the skill levels of the people they have in their
forces.
Jim Bexfield: One thing that I’ve observed
over time is people, especially military people,
come through Net Assessment and then they
leave and do other jobs, and they often com-
ment about how much of a mentor you were
to them and how much they learned while they
worked here. Are there any secrets to your suc-
cess in that regard?
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Andy Marshall: No. I know people say that.
I’m not sure what mentoring means in a way
[laughs], what is specific about that. I don’t think
of myself as what I would think of as mentoring
as instructing or teaching. I think it’smore amat-
ter of you have these issues, problems, tasks to
do, and you try to encourage and direct a little.
But mainly people should do their own thing.
Jim Bexfield: Yes, but I think the people that
come through appreciate the guidance that
you give, the insights that you provide. It helps
them grow as analysts.
Andy Marshall: That may be. I don’t think I
give a lot of guidance. [Laughter] Phil, do you
want to speak to that?
Phil Pournelle: I’ve been trying to be silent this
whole time, but I think you’re being a bit modest.
I think the most valuable thing you’ve provided
for us is time. Time to stop, time to read, time to
think. This is my third Pentagon tour and I’ve
never had thismuch time to actually sit and think
and read and talk to my colleagues about what’s
going on. I will concur with the statement that
you don’t necessarily give a lot of guidance be-
cause I lay things out and you say, ‘‘Yes, good.
Keep going.’’ [Laughter] It’s both encouraging
and daunting at the same time.
Andy Marshall: Yes. For the moment we
haven’t really been doing the same style of as-
sessments that we did, but then we did evolve
a kind of basic format of what the basic structure
of the thingwould be that had to be filled in. But I
think that’s right, we have problems and people
are here maybe two or three years, it’s like writ-
ing a PhD thesis. There’s a set of problems and
issues and you work on that. It’s not a different
problem every six minutes or every few days.
Phil Pournelle: Yes, if you can findme a place
that will accept a classified PhD dissertation,
please let me know. [Laughter] I’d like to turn
it in for credit, please.
Andy Marshall: At least my view of it is that
if it’s to be useful, it just needs to be analysis at
a level beyond what normally takes place. And
has been tailored very much so that sometimes
it’s used and sometimes not. To be an aid to
the Secretary or the very top level people, it’s
not trying to answer more mundane issues.
Bob Sheldon: Let me ask a question from your
economics background. One of the critiques
leveled against the Intel Community, I think
dating back to the 1960s or 1970s, was they did
a bad job of estimating the Soviet economy.
Andy Marshall: Terrible. That was one of the
great quarrels that both Schlesinger and I had
with them. But it’s not a failure just of the Intel-
ligence Community, it’s a failure of, I don’t
know whether it’s 85 percent or 99 percent of
theAmerican economics profession. It’s a shame,
I think, on them that they have not addressed it
as a question of ‘‘How the hell did you get it so
wrong?’’ And as I say, it’s not just the Intelligence
Community, it’s the whole of the economics pro-
fession. Paul Samuelson, I forget how late it is, he
was talking about the Soviet Union is likely to
pass us in the next decade. This was in the
1970s. And people who weremore sensible, like
Warren Nutter, were seen as nuts to raise ques-
tions about the likely performance of the Soviet
economy. So it strikes me that they’re nonlearn-
ing groups of people who are unwilling to say,
‘‘Here’s an error of really massive size’’; and
it’s important, because it’s critical to thinking
about, ‘‘okay, are they going to be exhausting
themselves or not?’’
They were also wrong about both the nu-
merator and the denominator. Theywerewrong
about the size of the economy (this is for the In-
telligence Community), and underestimating
the size and the cost of the Soviet program.
Bob Sheldon: In the current day, a similar accu-
sation has been made against the Intel Commu-
nity and the economists for not understanding
developmental economics, like Afghanistan and
Somalia and parts of Africa. Is there a way to
rectify that problem?
Andy Marshall: I don’t know. I don’t know
about the latter one. They’re certainly making,
as in the Soviet case or other kinds of more so-
cialist economies, they’re not making any at-
tempts that I can see to do better. It would
take a really critical examination of why did
they get it so wrong. That never took place as
far as I know.
Jim Bexfield: Let me ask a different question.
I recall a few years ago there was a lot of contro-
versy about whether Net Assessment should
continue as an office reporting directly to the
Secretary or whether it should be pushed some-
where else at a lower level. It’s fairly unique for
an office like yours to have stayed reporting to
the Secretary for more than 40 years.
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Andy Marshall: Well, it hasn’t in a way.
Brown didn’t like so many people reporting to
him, so administratively we became part of Pol-
icy, but we had direct reporting to him in the
sense of sending him documents, not through
the Policy people, but that worked fine. But
the relationship to the Secretary varied. Some
of them are a lot less interested than others in
the kind of analysis we do.
Jim Bexfield: Any insights about how that is-
sue got resolved?
Andy Marshall: The issue has been resolved.
I guess they’re still working on how it is exactly
we’re going to be part of Policy, but in principle,
that’s what’s supposed to eventually happen.
The 2015 NDAA (National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act for FY 2015) makes ONA a direct report
to the Secretary of Defense.
Jim Bexfield: Is it supposed to eventually
happen?
Andy Marshall: Yes.
Jim Bexfield: What do you see in the future
for Net Assessment? Where do you hope this
capability and group of people go?
AndyMarshall: I think if it’s to do the kind of
thing that it has been doing, it needs to have di-
rect access to the Secretary or the Deputy. How
it’s been used depended a lot on them. There
have been periods where we’ve been used,
and not just to produce net assessments, but to
do other kind of tasks. Schlesinger used the of-
fice, for example, to undertake some lessons
learned activities with respect to the Yom
Kippur War. Later efforts, we did a similar kind
of thing on the Falklands War. In the aftermath
of 9/11, Paul Wolfowitz (Undersecretary of De-
fense for Policy from 1989–1993) had us run sev-
eral special studies for him in addition. Also the
character of the office has changed. It was set up
at a time when the central issue was how mili-
tarily we stood relative to the Soviet Union, with
allies on both sides, but that was the focus. For
a while now, we’ve not had a central opponent.
I’ve had an interest in China since the middle
1980s, the most likely emerging really serious
problem. I don’t think that the US Government
as a whole is quite at that stage yet. [laughs] It
seems likely to me.
Bob Sheldon: I have a MORS question.
You’re loosely affiliated with the MORS com-
munity. We’ve invited you to speak at some
of our symposiums, and some of your people
participate in MORS. What’s your view of
MORS?
Andy Marshall: I personally haven’t been to
any for a long time.
Bob Sheldon: But you came to one at the Air
Force Academy a few years ago.
Andy Marshall: Yes, I don’t know the dates
of it. I like the MORS symposiums. I think it’s
terrific, meeting a lot of the people. So, I’m all
in favor of it. I don’t get around to going myself
very much.
Bob Sheldon: I’d like to turn it back to Phil.
What questions would you like to ask your boss
here?
Phil Pournelle: What do you think of the
trends within the Operations Research Society
community itself? MORS had a near-death
experience over the last couple of years. Some
argue it’s on life support and part of that may
be because of what it does or doesn’t do for its
customers. You’ve been on the outside, so to
speak, as was said, you’re loosely affiliated,
but what do you think—not necessarily the
MORS as the society but the operations re-
search community, those who participate or
don’t participate within MORS. The trends,
and whether or not they’re meeting their cus-
tomer’s needs.
Andy Marshall: I don’t know that I have the
sense. Within the Services themselves, only the
Army really has a substantial effort ongoing—
that’s the only one I know of and have hadmuch
contact with. In the Navy, there are people like
Wayne Hughes or others, but there’s not an or-
ganized unit really, as far as I know. I’ve lost
track of the Air Force in that area.
Jim Bexfield: I think the Air Force does too,
perhaps not as strong as the Army. The Navy
is, I think, third in terms of how they organize
and manage their operations research people,
and Marine Corps is maybe slightly below the
Navy. So I think theArmy is themost organized,
theAir Force sort of secondmost organized, and
then the Navy and then the Marine Corps. So, I
think you’re right.
Andy Marshall: But in terms of other things,
the analysis—given the Chinese being so much
like the Russians in the extensive role they seem
to give to operations analysis, I would think
a role for that, again, is something to look at.
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Phil Pournelle: So your own experience at
RAND, particularly in the early years, was with
these diverse communities coming together—
economics, psychology, et cetera, and they’re
more generalists. And yet, the Operations Re-
search Society as a whole seems to become more
and more specialists within specific disciplines
going into greater and greater details.
Andy Marshall: Yes. That struck me thinking
about it before the meeting, that while obvi-
ously RAND was in part inspired by the opera-
tions research done in World War II and was
kind of a continuation, extension of it. But yet
on the whole what it focused on was not en-
tirely, as you say, operations research, although
this shift that Wohlstetter made in carrying out
these broader studies, was like operations re-
search in the sense that the studies were focused
on how to carry out certain kinds of operations
better than they were otherwise programmed to
be. But much of the RANDwork was looking at
new technologies, where things are going to go.
Bob Sheldon: Let me circle back. You said one
of your parental influences was you had a lot of
books around the house to read. What kind of
books would you recommend to your people
that are working for you now?
Andy Marshall: I don’t know. The kinds of
things that interest me are histories. That’s why
I’ve, here in the office, invested a lot in a variety
of historical studies. Like whenwe got interested
in where they picked up on the Russian interest
in or belief that we were entering a new period
ofmilitary revolution,would be to say, ‘‘All right,
let’s look at past periods where there are big
changes that people think of as military revolu-
tions. What do they look like? How long do they
take? Why is it some countries do better than
others?’’ and things of that nature, and also strat-
egy. There’s a wonderful book on, I forget the
name of it now, well, about the Russian anticipa-
tion and then preparations for dealing with
Napoleon’s invasion in 1812. So, I think histories.
Bob Sheldon:Of those histories, can you give
us two or three that pop in your mind as being
the best history books recently?
Andy Marshall: There’s that one that I just
mentioned, the one about the Russian prepara-
tions. There are these things I sponsored on
the innovation in the Interwar years by Wick
Murray and others. Stephen Rosen’s book,Win-
ning the NextWar: Innovation and theModernMil-
itary. Again, innovation in the military is a huge
issue.
Jim Bexfield: This was very good. And it was
great learning a lot about your experiences and
ideas and relationships, and it brought back
many memories. So, we really appreciate it.
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